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Reflections From
Damaged Life
Saturday, 21 January 2017

Graham MacPhee on Trump's Inauguration
Today I wish to announce a new development at Reflectionsfromdamagedlife, a guest-posting by Graham
MacPhee on the intellectual implications of Trump's inauguration. I am delighted that Graham has offered
this essay to my blog, and I'd encourage any other friends, comrades or interested persons to contact me
too, if you are interested in doing likewise.
Conor

Trump’s Inauguration: What Could Critical Theory
Learn?
Guest post by Graham MacPhee
The inauguration of Donald Trump as the forty-fifth president of the United States raises immediate
questions about the current state of democracy and the priorities for political action both within the US
and beyond. But it might also cause those of us involved in the academic discourse of critical theory to
reflect on our own theoretical frameworks and assumptions, not least because of the apparent inability of
contemporary theoretical discourses in the humanities to account for the current predicament. Is there
anything to be learned for our own theoretical endeavors from the dynamics of social resentment and
political disenchantment which Trump’s campaign was able to harness, exploit, and channel to such
effect?
Although published a year before the election, I’d suggest that Wendy Brown’s recent
book Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Zone, 2015) suggests that there is, even if
the nature of the election poses significant challenges to her analysis. But for the purposes of addressing
the theoretical lessons of the Trump’s election, what is remarkable is the extent of her revision of some of
the basic assumptions of contemporary theory, a revision whose implications, it seems to me, have been
insufficiently acknowledged or thought through.

As Brown makes clear, and as reviewers have noted, the book uses but also criticizes Michel
Foucault’s account of neoliberalism; but the character and implications of Brown’s critique are far beyond
what we’ve seen in orthodox theory for a long time. Startlingly, given the extent of her indebtedness to
Foucault, Brown points out that his all-encompassing vision of power is wholly bereft of a conception of
politics or political action: “there is no political body, no demos acting in concert (even episodically) or
expressing aspirational sovereignty; there are few social forces from below and no shared powers of rule
or shared struggles for freedom” (73). Observing that “homo politicus is not a character in Foucault’s
story” (86), Brown further notes that in constructing his account of neoliberalism, “Foucault averted his
glance from capital itself as a historical and social force” (75).
Reviewers (as far as I can see) have tended to regard these insights as tactical adjustments to a
theoretical edifice that remains largely intact. But given the extraordinary preeminence accorded to
Foucault’s notions of governmentality and biopower in the Anglophone academy, I would suggest they
amount to much more than this. Indeed, in working through the implications of this critique, Undoing the
Demos significantly revises what might be regarded as the network of unacknowledged assumptions
that—in the wake of “critical theory” and the “theory wars”—have coalesced as “theory.”
Most obvious is Brown’s rehabilitation of the “demos” or “people”—presumably not so far away
from the (non-ethnically defined) people (Volk) that Hegel had identified as locating any formation of
ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Equally explicit is her retrieval of “freedom” as an open and revisable political
concept, “precisely the kind of individual and collaborative freedom associated with homo politicus for
self-rule and rule with others” (110). More obliquely, though unmistakably, Undoing the Demos envisages
a subjectivity whose cogency far exceeds the dispersal of deconstruction and the passivity of “subject
position”: rather, it is “the resource for opposing [neoliberalism] with another set of claims and another
vision of existence” (87; emphasis added). And at a more technical level, but just as challenging for
contemporary orthodoxy, is her insistence that “capital and capitalism are not reducible to an order of
reason,” and that “capitalism has drives that no discourse can deny” (75–76).
Together demos, freedom, and an operative subjectivity allow a critical return to the language of
the Western philosophical tradition, to the language of “city and soul” (22). The extent of Brown’s rewriting
of the last three decades of theory in the Anglophone academy is surely remarkable: against the
dominance of theoretical anti-humanism, she can write without irony of “human striving” as a value (11);
and against the anti-political language of governmentality, she can affirm that “moral reflection and
association making—these are the qualities that generate our politicalness” (88).

To be quite clear, my intention here is not to accuse Wendy Brown of intellectual bad faith, of
dodging between positions without owning up to it: indeed, far from it. In my view, Undoing the
Demos exhibits a refreshing sense of intellectual responsibility in rethinking a theoretical orthodoxy that
has become manifestly disabling in the face of the deepening political catastrophe of neoliberal
globalization. Her critical retrieval of the demos, of freedom, of a cogent subjectivity, and of a sense of the
dynamics of capital that exceed discourse, are intellectually honest responses to a predicament that is
growing worse daily. And if reviewers have not picked up on the profound nature of her book’s challenge
to prevailing orthodoxy, that’s hardly her fault. Brown is quite upfront in her critique of Foucault, and if she
remains tentative about the implications of this critique for reconceiving subjectivity, history, freedom, and
the shape of democracy, there are perhaps good historical reasons why.
My point is different. The lesson I take from Undoing the Demos is that we are enjoined to rethink
our theoretical coordinates in light of the political collapse that confronts us. But in that case, we need to
be attentive both to the changing shape of our unfolding predicament and to the problems or blockages in
our own ways of registering and thinking it. The recent election of Donald Trump as president
(notwithstanding his losing the popular vote) does not, to my mind, square with Brown’s account of the
absolute subordination of city and soul to the market in neoliberalism. And therefore it requires us to
reexamine even her remarkable revision of the coordinates of contemporary theory.
For all its critique of Foucault’s exclusion of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and therefore
politics, Undoing the Demos nonetheless reimposes these very same exclusions—but subsequently.
While the political experience of subjectivity as homo politicus may once have been operative,
neoliberalism is seen as “a distinctive mode of reason, of the production of subjects” (21) in which homo
oeconomicus—the register of subjectivity exercised in the market—liquidateshomo politicus, so “undoing
the demos.” Further, homo oeconomicus is denied the possibility of ever generating a new political
response, of ever resuscitating homo politicus, since it is now said to have been hollowed out of the
interest that traditionally drove civil society. “With the ascendency of neoliberalism,” Brown writes,
“interest has ceased to anchor or characterize homo oeconomicus” (78): and so, she concludes, “homo
oeconomicus today may no longer have interest at its heart, indeed, may no longer have a heart at all”
(84).
Without a heart, the residual homo oeconomicus is bereft of the chaotic and nonidentical striving
of interest, which means that there is no difference, no nonidentity, between soul, city, and market. The
economic rationality of “neoliberal reason,” now shorn even of the heart’s self-love, “configures both soul
and city” without remainder, residue, or nonidentity (27). Which means that the new face of power—

neoliberalism as a mode of rationality—is at once absolute and everywhere, pervading and dominating
subjectivity, city, and market.
Brown’s reduction of neoliberalism to an abstract “order of normative reason” (30) thus takes with
one hand what it gives with the other. If the city is made identical with the market, and the soul, excluded
from the political, has no heart, then where is the basis of that “moral reflection and association making”
which “are the qualities that generate our politicalness” (88)?
Whatever else might be said of the social dynamics capitalized on by Donald Trump, they cannot
be accused of being “heartless” in this sense—of lacking the chaotic and nonidentical striving of interest
and the anger and self-deceit of the heart (see Arlie Hochschild, “I Spent Five Years with Some of
Trump’s Biggest Fans,” Mother Jones, September/October 2016). Driving the Republicans' massive
electoral gains in 2016 (and underpinning the staggering irony of the Democratic Party’s rejection of
Senator Sander’s candidacy) is a significant divergence between popular sentiment and the dominant
neoliberal accounts of political and economic reality—even if the neoliberal project is the ultimate
beneficiary.
However we are to characterize the Republican sweep of presidency, Congress, governorships,
and state houses in 2016, Brown’s conception of the subordination of soul and city to the abstract
economic logics of neoliberalism does not work. This outcome happened precisely because market, soul,
and city are not identical; and equally, this nonidentity could have fostered other outcomes, had the
political forces squared up differently. Brown’s absolutization of power as neoliberal rationality ignores not
only the irrationality of this upsurge but also the potency of subjectivity and its responsiveness to the
dynamics of capital, elements that are by no means inseparable.
For all its ironies, Trump’s election urgently points to the need to revise many of contemporary
theory’s orthodoxies and assumptions. Most obviously, the inability to develop a conception of subjectivity
as plural yet cogent has not only made theory blind to the ways in which the dynamics of subjectivity are
actually unfolding, but has left it unable to defend and develop public institutions—which emerge through
the nonidentity of city, soul, and market—that might substantiate a vision of freedom and justice.
This connection was articulated two decades ago by the British philosopher Gillian Rose in
her Mourning Becomes Law (Cambridge University Press, 1996):
The presentation of power as plural yet total and all pervasive, and of opposition to power . . . as the
anarchic community, unwittingly and unwillingly participates in a restructuring of power which undermines
those semi-autonomous institutions . . . which alleviate the pressure of the modern state on the individual.

The plural but total way of conceiving power leaves the individual more not less exposed to the
unmitigated power of the state. (21)
Perhaps one lesson we might learn from the contradictory, often irrational, yet also understandable
dynamics that led to Trump’s election is to recognize how the generalization of difference in abstract
schemas (discourse, language, power/knowledge, or governmentality) means not only the absolutization
of power but also the liquidation of the nonidentity of social and political experience upon which any
alternative politics relies. As Rose had warned, “when a monolithic [and] plural character is attributed to
power . . . this attribution perpetuates blindness to the reconfiguration of power which we may be
assisting by our unarticulated characterization of it” (21).

Graham MacPhee is an academic based in Philadelphia. He is the author of The Architecture of the
Visible (2002) and Postwar British Literature and Postcolonial Studies (2011).
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